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Sammendrag 
I denne artikkelen brukes offisielle anslag for framtidige oljeinntekter og andelen pensjonister i 
befolkningen til å estimere framoverskuende finanspolitiske regler for Norge. Disse sammenliknes så 
med regler basert på permanentinntektshypotesen og “bird-in-hand” regelen. Resultatene indikerer at 
den finanspolitiske tilpassningen har vært delvis framoverskuende i forhold til utsiktene om økende 
aldringsutgifter, men bakoverskuende når det gjelder olje- og gassinntektene. Den estimerte 
finanspolitiske adferden i perioden 1954-2007 indikerer at Norges fiskale bærekraft kan være truet. 
Simuleringer viser at de fallende olje- og gassinntektene, sammen med økende utgifter knyttet til en 
aldrende befolkning, vil gjøre at myndighetenes netto fordringsposisjon vil bli betydelig redusert mot 
2060 dersom ikke finanspolitikken blir mer forsiktig, eller den nåværende pensjonsreformen viser seg 
å bli en suksess. 
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1. Introduction 
Oil windfalls and the anticipation of such windfalls can have a large impact on the public finances of a 
country. The often recommended permanent-income prescription states that oil-rich countries borrow 
in advance of an anticipated windfall, pay back and save during a windfall, and live of the interest on 
the accumulated assets after the windfall. If the windfall is unanticipated, they should only borrow 
once they get new information that net oil wealth has increased. Related is the celebrated Hartwick 
rule which is the point of departure for many policy makers in oil-rich states. It states that all oil 
revenue must be invested to transform the oil wealth in the crust of the earth into financial or other 
assets above the ground (Hartwick, 1977). The more conservative bird-in-hand rule says that the 
windfall can only be used once the oil revenue has come in.  
 
The major contribution of this paper is to use official forecasts of future oil revenue, painstakingly 
derived from a range of official documents, to estimate forward-looking fiscal rules for an oil-rich 
country and assess their sustainability. To the best of our knowledge, we believe this is the first time 
this has been done. Forecasts are more relevant for this purpose than estimating a data generating 
process for oil revenue from a small set of historical data, which would effectively lead to backward-
looking fiscal rules. The great advantage of using official forecasts over some estimated data 
generating process is that much more detailed information on future oil and gas revenue (new fields, 
future, announced changes in the tax and royalty system) and on the rising costs of a graying 
population are incorporated. Furthermore, official forecasts which are often of a technical nature are 
the ones that impinge on practical policy making, not forecasts from some data generation process. 
The continual revisions in forecasts also offer much needed variability to estimate fiscal rules. 
 
Although various studies offer cross-country estimates of fiscal rules and discuss the sustainability of 
fiscal stances for oil-rich countries (e.g., Ossowski et al., 2008; Bornhorst et al., 2009), for emerging 
and industrial economies (e.g., Mendoza and Ostry, 2008) and for advanced economies (e.g., Ghosh et 
al., 2011), none of them have used official forecasts. Furthermore, the estimates are confounded by 
differences in institutional quality, rule of law, corruption, etc. across countries, suffer from omitted 
variable bias as anticipated windfalls and the rising pension burden are not included, and fail to take 
account of the endogeneity of resource windfalls. Being inherently cross-sectional in nature, they do 
not offer a convincing treatment of intertemporal issues of managing oil windfalls.  
 
We therefore offer time-series estimates of forward-looking fiscal rules for a particular oil-rich 
country, Norway. We empirically test the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) and the associated 
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principles of tax and consumption smoothing (e.g., Barro, 1979; Deaton, 1992)1. We also allow for 
asset targets, habit persistence (Leigh and Olters, 2006; Olters, 2007) and relate our optimal rules to 
the pragmatic bird in hand (BIH) rule for the management of oil windfalls (e.g., Davis et al., 2002; 
Barnett and Ossowski, 2003; Medas and Zakharova, 2009). We also use official demographic 
forecasts to allow a graying population and rising pension burden. 
 
Thanks to long-term budgeting in Norway since the 1950s, we can construct a time series of official 
forecasts of oil revenue and the pension burden. Our time-series estimates of fiscal rules and analysis 
of sustainability build on earlier work (e.g., Barro, 1979; Bohn, 2007). We allow for anticipation 
effects of fiscal policy, but abstract from the role of anticipation effects on the real impacts of fiscal 
policy rules stressed in the recent literature (e.g., Mertens and Ravn, 2010; Romer and Romer, 2010).  
 
We focus on Norway, which puts its oil and gas revenue in a Savings Fund and draws roughly 4 percent 
per annum from it to finance public spending or tax cuts.2 This 4-percent rule was implemented in 2001 
and allows Norway to spread oil and gas revenues to future generations. The Savings Fund also allows 
Norway to stabilize the economy across the business cycle, since the 4% is meant to be an average over 
the business cycle. Also, as the value of the Fund varies with world asset markets, the government has 
the discretion to deviate from the 4% rule when it deems this necessary. Since Norway’s budgetary 
policies take account of declining oil revenue and possibly also of rising pension costs3, it has elements 
of the PIH rule. Some have argued (e.g, Barnett and Ossowski, 2003) that Norway’s budgetary policies 
also have elements of the so-called bird-in-hand (BIH) rule, which has two features: (i) all oil and gas 
revenue is put in a Fund; (ii) each year a percentage of the Fund is withdrawn for financing the budget 
deficit; and (iii) no borrowing takes place with future oil and gas revenue as collateral. We will estimate 
Norway’s fiscal reaction functions from historical data and see to what extent they have elements of the 
PIH and the BIH rules and examine whether Norway’s estimated fiscal stance is sustainable given 
declining oil and gas revenue and the rapidly rising pension burden.4 Our estimates suggest that 
Norway’s fiscal stance can be characterized as a blend of BIH and PIH and that Norway’s future pension 
                                                     
1 We allow for unemployment and business cycle variations, but abstract from behavioral relationships and general equilibrium 
effects. We take prices as given and focus on social welfare and intertemporal government budget constraints. An alternative is to 
evaluate fiscal policy rules in a DSGE framework (Pieschacon, 2008). We do not consider the resource curse, i.e., the negative effect 
of natural resource exports on the rate of economic growth found in cross-section studies emanating from Sachs and Warner (1997). 
2 From now on we refer to ‘oil’ or ‘hydrocarbons’ when we mean ‘oil and gas’. 
3 Earlier studies also pay attention to old-age demographics and the pension bill (Jafarov and Leigh, 2007). 
4 General equilibrium studies suggested that the aging of Norway’s population setting in after 2020 would require either an 
increase in taxes or a reform of the pension system (Heide, et al., 2006; Holmøy and Stensnes, 2008). Galaasen( 2009) finds 
that continuation of the current fiscal rule is consistent with a reduction of the tax rate in the short run and an increase of the 
tax rate towards 60 percent in the long run. These technical calibration exercises suggest that further policy reforms are 
needed, which indeed have been started. We estimate reaction functions describing actual government behavior over the past 
fifty years and use these to simulate what would have happened in the absence of recent reforms. 
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costs will lead to evaporation of accumulated assets by 2060 unless the fiscal stance is tightened or the 
pension system is reformed.5 In fact, recently further policy reforms have been undertaken so that the 
outlook for the net government asset position may not be so bleak. 
 
Section 2 discusses optimal management of a windfall in face of a graying population and offers some 
testable propositions on fiscal policy rules. Section 3 calculates permanent values of oil and gas 
revenues and spending needs from official forecasts of the Norwegian government. Section 4 tests the 
theory by estimating the cointegrating relationship and the resulting fiscal policy rules. Section 5 
estimates the short-run dynamics and presents impulse responses of fiscal policy. Section 6 offers 
some weak governments solvency tests and then simulates our estimated fiscal rules and compares 
them to PIH and BIH rules. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Managing windfall revenue: permanent income or bird in 
hand?  
Let dt denote net government debt (liabilities minus assets) at the end of period t, gt government 
spending (excluding net interest payments), τt the non-oil tax rate, yt the output gap (logarithmic 
deviation of output from its long-run trend value), and nt oil revenue accruing to the government in 
period t. We then have the government flow budget constraint: 
 
(1)  1(1 ) , 0,t t t t t td r d g y nτ φ φ−= + + − − − >   
 
where the parameter φ allows for automatic stabilizers. Variables are expressed as fractions of national 
income, so r is the growth-corrected real rate of interest. The government has access to international 
capital markets but the private sector is credit constrained.6 Given the no-Ponzi condition 
( lim (1 ) 0s t ss r d
−
+
→∞
+ = ), the present value of future oil revenues must cover government commitments 
(outstanding net government debt plus present value of future non-oil primary deficits, bt ≡ gt−τt−φyt). 
Hence, we have the government present-value budget constraint: 
                                                     
5 The recent 2009 White Paper on Long-Term Perspectives uses generational accounting to make projections of oil revenue 
and demographic trends to 2060 and also concludes that fiscal policy has to become more prudent; taxes have to be increased 
by 1 percent of GDP in 2060. These calculations are, of course, very sensitive to projections of the price of petroleum. In 
addition, the historical real return on the fund has been just below 3%. All this prompts the new director of Statistics Norway 
to argue for a 3% rather than a 4% rule, thereby providing the financial leeway for a less steeply rising non-oil deficit. 
6 Of course, many Norwegians do have access to good capital markets. Still, even in developed economies there are many 
hand-to-mouth consumers who cannot borrow. Their existence is crucial in understanding the time series behaviour of 
aggregate consumption (e.g., Campbell and Mankiw, 1989).  
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(2)
 
1
0 0
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) .s st s t t s
s s
r n r d r b
∞ ∞
− −
+ − +
= =
+ ≥ + + +    
Private consumption is given by output minus taxes and minus the quadratic costs of tax collection: 
 
(3)  ct = 1+φ yt−τt−½θ τt2, θ  > 0.  
 
The government maximizes the following intertemporal welfare function, 
 
(4)  ( )2*
0
1 , 0 1,
2
s
t s t s t s
s
c g gβ ψ β
∞
+ + +
=
 
− − < <     
 
which is (using (3)) equivalent to minimizing the intertemporal welfare loss function, 
 
(4′) ( )22 *
0
1 1 , 0 1,
2 2
s
t s t s t s t s
s
g gβ τ θτ ψ β
∞
+ + + +
=
 
+ + − < <     
 
subject to the present-value budget constraint (2), where we assume β (1+r) = 1 and ψ > 0 is the 
priority given to the spending target gt*. The problem of choosing the controls { , , , 0}t s t s t sg d sτ+ + + ≥ to 
minimize the welfare loss (4′) subject to the budget constraints (1) follows from the Lagrangian: 
 
(5) ( ) ( )22 * 1
0
1 1 (1 ) ,
2 2
s
t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t s t s
s
L g g r d g y n dβ τ θτ ψ η τ φ
∞
+ + + + + + − + + + + +
=
 
≡ + + − + + + − − − −    
 
where the present-value Lagrangian multipliers ηt corresponds to the marginal cost of funds at time t. 
Hence, the intra-temporal first-order conditions for gt+s and τt+s imply the following conditions: 
 
(6a)  ( )* 1 1, 0,t s t s t s tg g sψ θτ η+ + +− = + = > ∀ ≥  
 
Hence, (6a) implies that the marginal utility of spending on public goods must equal the marginal cost 
of funds. Furthermore, (6a) implies that a higher tax rate pushes up the cost of funds and thus lowers 
demand for public goods. The inter-temporal first-order condition for dt+s requires that the marginal 
cost of fund is the same for all future time periods: 
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(6b) 1(1 )   or  , 0 if (1 ) 1.t s t s t s tr s rβη η η η β+ + + ++ = = ∀ ≥ + =  
 
Hence, all expected future tax rates equal the current tax rate and similarly for all expected future 
shortfalls of public spending from target. Upon substitution of efficiency conditions (6a) and (6b) into 
the present-value budget constraint (2), we get the optimal responses implied by the PIH: 
 
(7a) ( )
1 *
1
1 1
,
P P
t t t
t
rd g nψ
τ
θ φ ψ
−
−
− −
− + −
=
+
 
(7b) * * 1 ,
P P
t t t t t t t tb g g g y rd nτ φ −≡ − = − − − +  
(7c) ( )
1 *
* * 1
1 1 1
,
P
P
P
P t t t
t t t t t t
rd g ng g g y rd n ψφ
θ φ ψ
−
−
−
− −
− + −
= − − − + +
+
 
(7d) * *1 ,
P P
t t t t t t td d g g y n nφ−− = − − + −
  
where permanent oil revenue is the annuity value of current and future oil revenue or the return on oil 
wealth in the ground, 1
0
(1 ) ,P st t s
s
n r r n
∞
− −
+
=
≡ + and the permanent target spending share equals 
* 1 *
0
(1 )
P s
t t s
s
g r r g
∞
− −
+
=
≡ + . The optimal responses (7) can be interpreted as policy rules which map the 
policy instruments (taxes, non-oil primary deficit, public spending, and the mutation in net 
government debt, all as fractions of GDP) to the state variable (last year’s ratio of net government debt 
to GDP) and exogenous variables (i.e., current and permanent values of oil revenue and desired public 
spending and the output gap). If meeting spending targets is of overriding importance (ψ → ∞), 
*
t tg g=  and solvency must be attained by variations in taxes rather than spending. The permanent 
value of the output gap is set to zero.  
 
In general, the optimal policy responses given in (7) imply the following PIH rules. First, (7a) and (7c) 
indicate that neither the cost of funds nor the tax rate nor spending should react to current oil revenues 
or spending needs. Second, (7b) indicates that in recessions (booms) the non-oil deficit must be 
loosened (tightened). Third, (7b) also indicates that with current spending targets below future 
expected spending targets (e.g., due to graying of the population), there should be a non-oil surplus in 
excess of permanent oil rents to provide for future spending needs (i.e., Pt tb n> ). Third, the cost of 
funds rises if future spending needs increase or the return on oil wealth falls. Fourth, (7d) implies that 
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a high net debt in itself does not warrant debt reduction as the required temporary tax hikes and 
spending cuts violate tax and consumption smoothing. Finally, (7b) and (7d) state that the non-oil 
deficit should react one-for-one with permanent oil revenues. Borrowing is called for ahead of a 
windfall, but during a windfall paying off debt followed by saving is warranted. The saving can be 
accumulated in a sovereign wealth fund during the oil boom, so that the increase in public and private 
consumption is sustained after the windfall has ceased. Falling oil wealth is thus gradually replaced by 
fund assets (cf. Hartwick, 1977). Finally, the size of the fund at the end of the windfall should exactly 
equal the permanent value of the stream of oil revenue evaluated at time zero when the news of the 
future windfall becomes known. The interest on the steady-size of the fund is just sufficient to finance 
the higher non-oil primary deficit. 
 
If the government does not borrow against future windfalls or respond to future needs such as a rising 
pension bill, we get the BIH rule which states that the government should put all oil revenue in a 
Sovereign Wealth Fund and draw 4 percent per year from the Fund for general budget purposes, i.e., 
to finance an increment in the non-oil primary deficit, Δbt. 7 The government might also have a 
discretionary transfer ht from the Fund to the general budget, so the increment in the non-oil primary 
deficit and the development of the Sovereign Wealth Fund are given by: 
 
(8a) 10.04 .t t tb f h−Δ = +  
(8b) 1(1 0.04) ,t t t tf r f n hν −= + + − + −  
 
where ft denotes the stock of assets in the Fund and ν the premium earned by investment in the Fund 
over the risk-free interest rate. 8 Denoting gross government debt by ,Gtd  net government liabilities are 
defined as .Gt t td d f≡ −  The BIH supposes that the government can or does not use future oil revenue 
as collateral even when it anticipates higher oil and gas production sometime before the higher oil and 
gas revenue accrue to the government, hence it does not react to .Pn   
                                                     
7 The BIH rule is an ad-hoc way to buffer against future oil and price shocks. Building on the multi-period 
framework of precautionary saving with income uncertainty (e.g., Sibley, 1975; Zeldes, 1989), one can show that 
oil price uncertainty induces countries to extract oil more aggressively and establish precautionary buffers (van 
der Ploeg, 2010), especially if the policy maker is very prudent and oil prices are more volatile. Inevitably, 
windfalls occur as revenues turn out better than the conservative forecasts of a prudent policy maker, thereby 
producing the financial leeway a rising non-oil deficit.    
8 The BIH rule does not state how the increment in the non-oil budget deficit is divided into an incremental increase in public 
spending and an incremental cut in taxes.   
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The BIH rule is inspired by Norwegian policy practice and does not follow from minimizing some 
welfare loss function. Since the BIH rule precludes borrowing, consumption is too low ahead of the 
windfall; too high during the windfall, and gradually falls back to its original level after the windfall. 
The BIH rule thus violates principles of tax and consumption smoothing and is unhelpful if the 
pension burden is expected to rise, especially if the Fund prevents the government from saving more 
in response to the rising pension burden. If the return on investments in the sovereign wealth fund is 
less than 4% plus the rate inflation (say, 1.5% per annum) plus the real growth rate of the economy 
(say, 2% per annum), the Fund as a share of GDP gradually falls to zero after the windfall. Else, the 
Fund grows indefinitely.  
 
The PIH with habit persistence implies that society gets hooked on high consumption during a 
windfall, but finds it tough to cut consumption afterwards (Leigh and Olters, 2006; Olters, 2007). This 
leads to an extra term 1 1 1( )t t tb g rdξ − − −− − in the expression for the optimal non-oil primary deficit 
(7b), where 0 < ξ < 1 is the degree of habit persistence. With ever-lasting habits (ξ = 1), the non-oil 
primary deficit follows a random walk if public spending does not change, so that (7b) becomes  
1 1 ,t t t t tb g g b ε− −= − + +  where εt is the normally distributed stochastic error term. 
 
Impatient and inconsistent politicians prefer spending hikes and tax cuts now rather than tomorrow 
and regret them when the time comes to cut the budget and raise taxes to repay accumulated debt plus 
interest. This can be rationalized with hyperbolic discounting (cf., Laibson, 1997). With targets for the 
size of the Fund, the government forcefully builds up assets with temporary hikes in taxes and cuts 
spending. As a result, tax rates decline and public spending shares rise over time. The reaction 
coefficient of the deficit to public debt is greater than the real interest rate r in this case. With capital 
scarcity one must use the windfall to bring down debt, stimulate investment at home and speed up 
economic development rather than accumulate sovereign wealth (Collier, et al., 2010; van der Ploeg 
and Venables, 2011). With Dutch disease and absorptive capacity problems (van der Ploeg and 
Venables, 2010), a country may put some of the windfall in sovereign wealth until bottlenecks in the 
non-traded sectors are alleviated. These issues are more relevant for developing economies.  
 
On the basis of the above, we specify the following time-series model:  
(9a) 0 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 6 7
P P
t t t t t t t t tb n d f y p n pβ β β β β β β β ε− −= + + + + + + + +  and 
(9b) 0 1 2 1 3 1 4 5 6 7 ,
P P
t t t t t t t t tn d f y p n pτ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ θ− −= + + + + + + + +  
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where pt denotes the number of people in the population aged 67 or older divided by those in the 
working-age population, 1
0
(1 )P st t s
s
p r r p
∞
− −
+
=
≡ + the permanent value of this dependency ratio, and all 
other variables are expressed as shares of national income. The econometric specification for the ratio 
of public spending to GDP follows directly from adding (9a) and (9b). The stochastic error terms 
tε and θt are normally distributed with zero mean and are serially uncorrelated. The PIH corresponds 
to the null hypothesis:  
 
(10) 1 2 3 4 5 7 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0, , 0, 0, 1  and
0, , 0, 0, 1, 0.
r
r
β β β β β β β
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ
= = − = < = − > =
= = − = = = = − >
 
 
Two reasons for public spending to deviate from its permanent value are the business cycle (picked up 
by the output gap) and future pension commitments (picked up by the projected fraction of pensioners 
in the population).  Demography proxies future pension and health liabilities. The PIH denies any 
effect of current oil/gas revenues on the non-oil primary deficit, the tax rate or spending. The PIH may 
be observationally equivalent to an ad-hoc model without Ptn  or .
P
tp  For example, if oil revenue 
declines at the rate α, we have Pt t
rn n
r α
 
=  +   
which is equivalent to our null hypothesis if β1 = 
r/(r+α) < 1 if Ptn is omitted. Bornhorst et al. (2009) find in a panel of 30 oil-producing countries that 
the non-oil tax take is reduced by 20% of the oil revenue coming in, which is consistent with the PIH 
if 0.2pt tn n= or a decline of oil revenues  of α = 4r, say 8 percent, per annum. 
 
If governments do not adhere to the PIH, the non-oil primary budget deficit may react to actual rather 
than permanent oil revenue leading to the alternative null hypothesis β1 > 0, 0 < β6 < 1 and 0 < γ1 < 1, 
−1 < γ6 < 0. Forcefully building up a target Fund size implies β2 > − r and perhaps γ2 > r. With habit 
persistence, the current tax rate is a weighted average of the PIH tax rate and last year’s tax rate. 
Precaution implies buffers and gradual tax cuts, which suggests a negative constant in the rule for the 
non-oil/gas primary deficit. Since the BIH does not use future oil revenue as collateral, it implies that 
the relevant null hypothesis is 6 6 0β γ= = .  
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3. Forecasts of future spending needs and oil and gas revenues 
Official projections indicate that the expected return on the Fund grows until the 2030s and then tapers 
off as share of GDP, and primary spending rises from 8% of mainland GDP in 2007 to 15% in 2060.9 
This is due to first rising and then falling contributions to the general budget from the Fund and due to 
a rising pension bill. Production from proven oil and gas reserves is anticipated to decline substantially 
during the next twenty five years. Even allowing for improved recovery, discoveries of new fields and 
undiscovered resources, forecasts show a decline in oil production levels.  
 
Figure 1: Projected net oil and gas cash flow to the government up to 2060 
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Source: Ministry of Finance January 2009 (Perspektivmeldingen) 
 
Fig. 1 shows projected net oil and gas cash flows to the government up to 2060. These declining cash 
flows are sensitive to the projected oil price. Fig. 2(a) gives oil prices together with the values 
predicted by the Ministry of Finance at various instants of time (measured in fixed 2007 NOK with 
Norwegian CPI as deflator). As the years pass, the forecasted ‘Hotelling’ ramps for oil prices have 
been replaced by forecasts based on random walks with drift in line with empirical evidence 
(Hamilton, 2009). The production forecasts plotted in fig. 2(b) show a hump-pattern for the next five 
decades and many revisions. Fig. 2(c) shows that, as a result of improved recoveries and discovery of 
new fields, the declining paths of oil and gas reserves have been continuously revised upwards.  
 
                                                     
9 These do not include the savings from other pension reforms and the projections of health and old-age expenditures rely on 
a constant real cost per service user, so it is more a technical prediction. 
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Figure 2: Oil price and oil and gas production and reserve forecasts throughout time 
(a) Oil price forecasts 
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(b) Production forecasts 
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(c) Oil and gas reserves forecasts 
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Source: Ministry of finance, Statistics Norway and authors calculations 
 
Our estimates of the fiscal reaction coefficients are based on these continuously revised official 
forecasts of oil reserves and revenue, but also on the changing offical forecasts of the dependency ratio 
shown in fig. 3. The dependency ratio is a crude measure of pension and health expenditures, but 
econometrically it will have the advantage of being relatively exogenous to fiscal behavior and is thus 
more likely to lead to unbiased estimates in section 4. Of course, this is a simplification as there will 
be other changes (e.g., longevity change, Baumol’s cost disease for the care or new medical 
techniques and medicines) which are not captured by the dependency ratio. 
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Figure 3: Forecasts of permanent dependency ratio throughout time 
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Source: Ministry of finance, Statistics Norway and authors calculations 
 
In the 1970s the Ministry of Finance (correctly) forecasted a turning point in the dependency ratio path 
around 1990, though the levels of the projected dependency ratios were a bit low (upper left panel). In 
the 1980s the Ministry forecasted growth to turn positive around 2000 (upper right panel). This turning 
point was moved ahead in time during the 1990s (lower left panel). By comparing the two lower 
panels, we see that in the 1998-2001 publication the growth in the dependency ratio was forecasted to 
turn from positive to close to zero in the late 2020s and later on to negative. This forecast changed 
subsequently and the three last forecasts presented in the lower right panel show a growing 
dependency ratio towards 2060. We test whether these changing forecasts of the future dependency 
ratio impacted fiscal rules. 
 
From a fiscal point of view, the most relevant measure of oil and gas revenue is the present value of 
the cash flow collected by the Norwegian state. Fig. 4 therefore plots the permanent value of future oil 
and gas revenues based on official forecasts of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance. The left panel 
gives current production values (measured as production of oil-equivalents multiplied with the oil 
price) together with permanent values calculated from official forecasts throughout time. Permanent 
values are below actual values and show lower growth over time, which reflects relatively rapid 
depletion of oil and gas reserves. The right panel of fig. 4 decomposes permanent production value 
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into permanent oil price and permanent oil-equivalents of oil and gas production. The permanent oil 
price decreases from its peak in the mid-1980s. The permanent production path increases steadily from 
mid-1970s until 1998-2001, when it peaks.   
 
Figure 4: Current and permanent values of oil and gas production 
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Source: Ministry of finance, Statistics Norway and authors calculations. The two upper panels picture natural 
logarithms of millions of 2007-NKR. 
4. Cointegration and estimation of the fiscal rules 
Using Norwegian data for the period 1954-2007 (see appendix), we estimate the parameters that 
identify the fiscal rules (9a)-(9b) where the fiscal rule for public spending follows from adding (9a) 
and (9b). Forward-looking behavior, captured by the permanent values of oil and gas revenue and the 
dependency ratio, is a key aspect. Thanks to a tradition of long-term budgeting since 1953, we can 
include official forecasts for the expectations on oil and gas revenue and the dependency ratio. The 
explanatory variables of interest are the transitory component of the dependency ratio, net asset and oil 
and gas revenue measures.10 Testing for unit roots reveals that all these variables are non-stationary 
and I(1). The dependency ratios are purely demographic, so exogenous to fiscal adjustments. Net 
assets are included with a one year lag, hence predetermined as far as the fiscal reaction is concerned. 
Oil and gas revenue can directly be influenced by fiscal policy; e.g., the government might use its 
majority stake in StatoilHydro to increase dividends if the deficit is high, inducing an upward bias in 
the OLS estimates of the effect of current oil and gas revenue on the deficit. Given that the variables in 
(9a)-(9b) are I(1) and our fiscal reaction functions will be cointegration relationships between the 
variables b (or g or t), n, np, p-pp, f-dg and y, instruments can be used to achieve consistent estimates 
                                                     
10 The Fund was built up only from 1996 and then increased rapidly in size. As our estimates cover a longer period, we focus 
on net assets in the empirics (i.e. imposing the restriction β2 = - β3). For the dependency ratio, we are interested in the 
transitory component, i.e. the difference between the current and permanent dependency ratio, and impose the restriction β5  = 
- β7, since (7b) indicates that the primary budget deficit is driven by the transitory component of the target level of public 
spending.   
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(Phillip and Hansen, 1990).11 We use current and permanent oil and gas production value as 
instruments for current and permanent hydrocarbon income, which are directly related through the tax 
system and the government’s stakes in hydrocarbon enterprises. 
 
The production value measures are valid instruments (“exogenous”) in our setting, since the 
Norwegian system of allocating production licenses allows the oil companies to determine the 
depletion speed themselves. The government only influences the number and distribution of 
production licenses and these are taken at the earliest stage of the oil field’s life cycle, so there is little 
feedback from fiscal policy to the oil and gas production volume. The government may affect 
depletion speed with the environmental tax, but this tax is very low. The oil price is the other 
component of current production value and is determined on the world market. The government’s 
prediction of production value underlies our measure of permanent production value, which is 
predominantly based on factors such as geological exploration, private search activity for new fields, 
the speed of depletion in developed fields and assumptions about the oil price. 
 
Panel A of table 1 shows the first-stage IV regression for our econometric time-series model (9a)-(9b) 
in panel B. Current oil and gas production value predicts current oil and gas revenue with a coefficient 
of 0.46. For permanent production value, we find a robust positive coefficient of 0.2. Partial R-squared 
and F-tests indicate that predictive power of the instruments is good. Test statistics of the Augmented 
Engle-Granger test for cointegration are shown in the bottom rows of panel A. We reject a unit root in 
the residuals from the current oil and gas revenue equation (see statistics in bold), but the evidence 
against a unit root is weaker for permanent oil and gas revenue. The non-stationarity in the 
endogenous variables should be driven by the non-stationarity of the exogenous variables through a 
cointegration relationship for 2SLS to be valid for non-stationary data, so we must interpret our 2SLS 
results with caution (Hsiao, 1997, 2006).12 The unit root tests of the residuals from the estimated fiscal 
reaction functions reported in panel B of table 1 indicate that a unit root cannot be rejected in the 
residuals. Only for the non-oil/gas primary deficit reaction function estimated with OLS can we in one 
case (zero lags) reject a unit root. With the caveat of lack of cointegration, we briefly discuss the 
results of table 1 before showing that spurious correlation is not a big concern. 
 
                                                     
11 Even irrelevant or spurious instruments can be used for consistent estimation in a cointegrating system as the spurious 
correlation is enough for the instrument to meet the relevance condition (Phillip and Hansen, 1990; Phillips, 2006). We prefer 
to use relevant instruments (cf., Bårdsen and Haldrup, 2006).   
12 However, if our assumption of strictly exogenous explanatory variables/instruments does not hold, the OLS and 2SLS 
estimates of the cointegration relationship are inefficient and can also produce biased estimates in our finite sample (Bårdsen 
and Haldrup, 2006; Banerjee et al., 1986; Montalvo, 1995; Gonzalo, 1994). 
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Table 1: Fiscal responses with permanent oil and gas revenue 
Panel A: First stage 
 Oil and gas revenue current (n) Oil and gas revenue permanent (np) 
 OLS OLS 
Dependency ratio current - permanent (p - pp) -0.355** -0.628*** 
 (0.152) (0.180) 
Last year’s net assets (f - dG = - d) -0.009 0.024 
 (0.023) (0.031) 
Output gap (y) 0.059 0.061 
 (0.093) (0.092) 
Oil and gas production value (v) 0.456*** 0.041 
 (0.051) (0.042) 
Oil and gas production value permanent (vp) -0.075** 0.201*** 
 (0.035) (0.032) 
Constant -0.007*** -0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Observations 54 54 
R-sq 0.92 0.87 
   
AEG test on residuals form first stage, lags:   
0 -5.327 -3.605 
1 -5.997 -3.814 
2 -5.159 -3.451 
3 -4.097 -4.482 
Critical values: 1% -5.387; 5% -4.685; 10% -4.336.     
 
Panel B:  Second stage  
 (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) 
Reference to equation: (9a)  (9b) (9a)  (9b) 
Dependent variable: Deficit (b) Expenditure (g) Taxes (t) Deficit (b) Expenditure (g) Taxes (t) 
Estimation method: IV IV IV OLS OLS OLS 
Oil and gas revenue current (n) 0.356** 0.939*** 0.583*** 0.326*** 0.772*** 0.446*** 
 (0.142) (0.150) (0.224) (0.098) (0.128) (0.161) 
Oil and gas revenue permanent (np) 0.709*** -0.800*** -1.509*** 0.313** -0.660*** -0.974*** 
 (0.255) (0.305) (0.367) (0.134) (0.237) (0.226) 
Dependency ratio current - permanent (p - pp ) 1.491*** 1.142*** -0.349 1.583*** 1.119*** -0.464* 
 (0.171) (0.265) (0.275) (0.176) (0.256) (0.261) 
Last year’s net assets (f - dG = - d) 0.081* 0.378*** 0.298*** 0.150*** 0.387*** 0.237*** 
 (0.044) (0.066) (0.076) (0.032) (0.060) (0.054) 
Output gap (y) -0.598*** -0.179 0.419 -0.514*** -0.148 0.365 
 (0.220) (0.221) (0.294) (0.192) (0.215) (0.254) 
Constant -0.010* 0.234*** 0.244*** -0.012*** 0.233*** 0.244*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
Observations 54 54 54 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.68 0.86 0.70 0.72 0.86 0.73 
Shea n 0.69 0.69 0.69    
Shea np 0.56 0.56 0.56    
F instr. N 52.30 52.30 52.30    
F instr. np 21.54 21.54 21.54    
AEG test on residuals from second stage, lags:       
0 -4.018 -3.946 -3.732 -4.419 -3.681 -3.115 
1 -4.047 -2.861 -3.300 -3.983 -2.625 -2.918 
2 -4.277 -2.490 -3.120 -4.109 -2.427 -2.971 
3 -3.426 -2.630 -2.977 -3.130 -2.685 -2.584 
Critical values: 1% -5.387; 5% -4.685; 10% -4.336.  
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For the AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test, critical values are based on McKinnon (2010) and 
generated from the Stata program module Schaffer (2010). The optimal lag-length due to the AIC and BIC criteria is 1 period.  
 
Both the estimated IV and OLS reactions for the non-oil/gas primary deficit suggest that a third of 
each extra Krone of oil and gas revenue is spent on increasing the deficit. For permanent revenue, 
these effects are 0.7 and 0.3 under IV and OLS, respectively. A percentage point change in the current 
over permanent dependency ratio increases the non-oil/gas primary deficit by about 1.5 percentage 
points of GDP for both the IV and OLS estimates, which reflects higher current spending needs 
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compared to later spending needs. For the previous year’s net assets, the coefficients are 0.08 and 0.15 
in IV and OLS; both bigger than the relevant interest rate. The OLS bias seems only severe for 
permanent oil and gas revenue and net assets. Based on signs, magnitudes and statistical significance, 
the estimates of the fiscal political responses presented in table 1 are thus consistent with the theory 
put forward in section 2. 
 
For completeness, we re-estimate by including the instruments directly in our regressions. A structural 
interpretation of the coefficients on oil and gas revenue requires knowledge of the share of production 
value that goes to the government. We do not have such information, but the first stage for current oil 
and gas revenue (column 1, upper panel, table 1) gives a rough estimate of the average government 
take of a marginal change in the production value in our sample. We rescale both of the oil and gas 
production value parameters estimated in table 2 with the first-stage coefficient on current oil and gas 
production value to make them comparable with our other estimates.  
 
Table 2: Estimates of fiscal rules with production value directly (v and vp) 
 (a) (b) (c) 
Reference to equation: (9a)  (9b) 
Dependent variable: Deficit (b) Expenditure (g) Taxes (t) 
Estimation method: OLS OLS OLS 
Oil and gas production value (v) 0.191*** 0.395*** 0.204*** 
 (0.063) (0.060) (0.078) 
Oil and gas production value permanent (vp) 0.115** -0.231*** -0.347*** 
 (0.049) (0.063) (0.060) 
Dependency ratio current - permanent (p - pp ) 0.919*** 1.310*** 0.391 
 (0.191) (0.335) (0.336) 
Last year’s net assets (f – dG = - d) 0.094*** 0.351*** 0.257*** 
 (0.032) (0.059) (0.057) 
Output gap (y) -0.534*** -0.172 0.362* 
 (0.172) (0.195) (0.212) 
Constant -0.022*** 0.238*** 0.260*** 
 (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) 
Observations 54 54 54 
R-sq 0.79 0.85 0.75 
    
Re-scaled size corresponding to hydrocarbon revenue#:    
Hydrocarbon production value (v) 0.419 0.866 0.447 
Hydrocarbon production value permanent (vp) 0.252 -0.507 -0.761 
    
AEG test on residuals, lags:    
0 -5.008 -3.988 -3.451 
1 -4.885 -2.849 -3.444 
2 -4.906 -2.722 -3.376 
3 -3.523 -2.486 -2.742 
Critical values: 1% -5.387; 5% -4.685; 10% -4.336.  
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For the AEG (Augmented Engle-Granger) test, critical values are based on McKinnon (2010) 
and generated from the Stata program module Schaffer (2010). The optimal lag-length due to the AIC and BIC criteria is 1 period. #To make 
coefficients comparable, coefficients are rescaled by dividing the current and permanent hydrocarbon production value coefficients by 0.456, 
i.e., the first-stage coefficient in column 1 of the top panel of table 1.   
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Table 3: Estimates of non-oil/gas primary deficit (b) with permanent oil and gas revenue 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Reference to equation: (9a) (9a) (9a) (9a) 
Dependent variable: Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) Deficit (b) 
Estimation method: FMOLS CCR FMOLS CCR 
Oil and gas revenue current (n) 0.404*** 0.424**   
 0.148 0.165   
Oil and gas revenue permanent (np) 0.368* 0.339   
 0.192 0.208   
Oil and gas production value (v)   0.235*** 0.233*** 
   0.058 0.058 
Oil and gas production value permanent (vp)   0.120*** 0.122** 
   0.044 0.046 
Dependency ratio current - permanent (p - pp) 1.869*** 1.835*** 0.949*** 0.905*** 
 0.232 0.260 0.225 0.267 
Last year’s net assets (f – dG = - d) 0.172*** 0.169*** 0.089** 0.087** 
 0.045 0.047 0.036 0.038 
Output gap (y) -0.629*** -0.608*** -0.611*** -0.598*** 
 0.179 0.171 0.132 0.126 
Constant -0.013** -0.013* -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.005 
Observations 53 53 53 53 
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.78 0.78 
Re-calculated size corresponding to Hydrocarbon 
revenue# : 
    
Oil and gas production value (v)   0.515 0.511 
Oil and gas production value permanent (vp)   0.263 0.268  
Cointegration tests on residuals  n and np  v and vp  
 Null hypothesis  Test statistic Probability  Test statistic Probability  
Engle-Granger Not cointegrated Engle-Granger tau -4.463 0.145 § -5.058 0.047 § 
(H0: Not cointegrated)  Engle-Granger z -28.396 0.160 § -33.503 0.058 § 
         
Phillips-Ouliaris Not cointegrated Phillips-Ouliaris 
tau 
-4.459 0.146 § -4.963 0.058 § 
(H0: Not cointegrated)  Phillips-Ouliaris z -28.301 0.162 § -30.449 0.109 § 
         
Hansen Parameter Inst. Cointegrated Lc statistic 0.056 > 0.2 ¤ 0.598 > 0.2 ¤ 
(H0: Cointegrated)         
Park Added Variables Cointegrated Chi-square 3.319 0.190  3.178 0.204  
(H0: Cointegrated)         
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The sample is adjusted in accordance with the estimation methods FMOLS (Fully Modified 
OLS) and CCR (Canonical Cointegrating Regression) to 1955-2007. Long-run variances are computed using the Bartlett kernel with Newey-
West fixed bandwidth of 4.0000. # To make coefficients comparable, coefficients are rescaled by dividing the current and permanent oil and 
gas production value coefficients by 0.456, i.e. the first stage coefficient in column 1 of the top panel of table 1. Cointegration tests on re-
siduals: Bold p-values indicate support for cointegration. §MacKinnon (1996) p-values. ¤Hansen (1992) p-values. Tests performed in 
EViews 7 and default options are chosen. 
 
For the non-oil/gas primary deficit, we now find stronger support for cointegration as we reject a unit 
root in the residuals with the tests including zero, one and two lags (the AIC and the BIC criteria 
suggest that one lag is appropriate). From the re-scaled coefficients reported in the lower panel of table 
2, one extra Krone of current oil and gas revenue (the equivalent of 1/0.456=2.2 extra kroner in 
production value given the first-stage estimate in the top panel of table 2) increases the non-oil/gas 
primary deficit by 0.42 Krone. The corresponding number for the permanent measure of oil and gas 
revenue is 0.57. These numbers are similar to the 2SLS estimates, 0.36 and 0.70 (see table 1). The 
coefficient on net assets is also similar, but the coefficient on the dependency ratio variable is now 
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considerably smaller than the IV and OLS estimates of table 1; around 0.9 rather than 1.5. The lower 
size is driven mainly by a larger expenditure effect than what was found in table 1. 
 
If regressors are not strictly exogenous, the OLS estimates of the cointegrating relationship do not 
have an asymptotically efficient distribution, thus invalidating standard tests. To avoid relying too 
heavily on the assumed exogeneity of our instruments, table 3 presents FMOLS (Phillips and Hansen, 
1990) and CCR estimates (Park, 1992) without instrumenting oil and gas measures with production 
value instead of oil and gas revenue.  
 
We now also offer additional tests on cointegration next to the Engle-Granger test. The Engle-Granger 
and Phillips-Ouliaris tests do not reject a unit root for the formulation with oil and gas revenue, but do 
reject a unit root in the formulation with oil and gas production value (consistent with tables 1 and 2). 
The Hansen Parameter Instability and Park Added Variables tests do not reject cointegration for either 
specification. Not rejecting a unit root in the residuals of table 1 might thus be due to low power of the 
tests rather than lack of cointegration. Regardless of the estimation method, current oil and gas 
revenue/production is quantitatively and statistically more important than their permanent value. As 
before, using oil and gas revenue rather than the more exogenous oil and gas production decreases the 
coefficients on the dependency ratio measure and net assets dramatically. We prefer the latter 
estimates in view that dealing with identification is essential also under non-stationarity and 
cointegration (Hsiao, 2006).  
 
The estimated effect of current oil and gas revenue on the primary non-oil/gas deficit varies between 
0.33 and 0.60; the effect of permanent oil and gas revenue varies between zero and 0.37 (except for 
one outlier estimate of 0.71 in 2SLS). The PIH implies values of 1 and −1 for the coefficients on 
current and permanent oil and gas revenue (see (10)), which are rejected by the data. The BIH 
suggests, on the contrary, a zero coefficient on permanent oil and gas income and that only already 
accumulated assets should affect spending decisions. Hence, the relatively larger coefficient on current 
versus permanent oil and gas revenue is compatible with elements of the BIH rule. 
 
The estimated effect of the difference between the current and permanent dependency ratio on the non-
oil/gas primary deficit is between 0.90 and 1.87. The PIH has been imposed for pension needs, so the 
budget deficit should finance temporary pension needs and provide for future pension commitments in 
a graying society. The past net asset-GDP ratio has a significant effect on the primary non-oil/gas 
deficit. The coefficient varies between 0.08 and 0.17 and is larger than the relevant interest rate, which 
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suggests that the fiscal regime is sustainable. The output gap has a negative effect on the non-oil/gas 
primary deficit, so fiscal policy is anti-cyclical.  
 
Table 4: Estimates of short run dynamics of fiscal rules 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
 ΔDeficit (b) ΔDeficit (b) ΔDeficit (b) ΔDeficit (b) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
ΔOil and gas revenue current (Δn) 0.025 0.063   
 (0.140) (0.103)   
ΔOil and gas revenue permanent (Δnp) -0.008 -0.174   
 (0.150) (0.137)   
ΔOil and gas production value (Δv)   -0.116** -0.113* 
   (0.055) (0.063) 
ΔOil and gas production value permanent (Δvp)   -0.008 -0.022 
   (0.044) (0.047) 
ΔDependency ratio current - permanent (Δp - Δpp) 0.311* 0.400*** 0.259** 0.420*** 
 (0.179) (0.139) (0.114) (0.146) 
ΔLast year’s net assets (Δf – ΔdG = - Δd) -0.048 -0.097* -0.067 -0.098** 
 (0.050) (0.051) (0.046) (0.043) 
ΔOutput gap (Δy) -0.467*** -0.530*** -0.428*** -0.462*** 
 (0.137) (0.145) (0.132) (0.133) 
Lagged residual -0.400***  -0.458***  
 (0.092)  (0.095)  
Lagged Deficit (b)  -0.437***  -0.491*** 
  (0.081)  (0.085) 
Lagged Oil and gas revenue current (n)  0.374***   
  (0.092)   
Lagged Oil and gas revenue permanent (np)  -0.017   
  (0.131)   
Lagged Oil and gas production value (v)    0.149*** 
    (0.037) 
Lagged Oil and gas production value permanent (vp)    0.020 
    (0.034) 
Lagged Dependency ratio current - permanent (p - pp)  0.801***  0.565*** 
  (0.177)  (0.193) 
Lagged Last year’s net assets (f – dG = - d)  0.070**  0.061** 
  (0.032)  (0.029) 
Lagged Output gap (y)  -0.250***  -0.247*** 
  (0.092)  (0.089) 
Constant 0.002 -0.004 0.003 -0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Observations 53 53 53 53 
R-sq 0.36 0.46 0.46 0.51 
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
 
We conclude that the fiscal behavior with respect to oil and gas income has been quite close to BIH, 
while the reactions to the dependency ratios are more in line with the PIH. Since transfers to the Fund 
were not undertaken until 1996, we have also estimated separate coefficients for the current and 
permanent oil and gas revenue for the periods 1954-95 and 1996-2007 (Harding and van der Ploeg, 
2009). Our findings were that current oil/gas revenue had a reaction coefficient greater than one during 
the first two decades of the oil era, which suggests that borrowing (also to finance large oil 
investments) against rising oil and gas revenue took place in line with the PIH. We did not find much 
variation over time of the dependency ratios. The Fund had a relatively strong effect on budgetary 
behavior. These estimates reflect the introduction of the fiscal rule of 2001 and lack of formal rules 
earlier on. Indeed, the non-oil/gas primary deficit jumped upward during the 1970s. Also, as 
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mentioned in section 3, if oil and gas revenue are expected to fall, the PIH implies that estimating a 
model without permanent oil/gas revenue leads to a coefficient on current oil and gas revenue lower 
than unity. Zooming in on sub-periods is useful, but our conclusion from our estimates in tables 1-3 
based on the full sample period that the Norwegian fiscal stance was dominated by a relatively heavy 
emphasis on current oil/gas revenue stands. It is also clear that even though Norway did not 
necessarily get it right for some years, it seems to have learned and reformed in time. Still, our time-
invariant estimates of the fiscal reaction functions are useful to examine what would have happened if 
further reforms would not have taken place.13 
5. Short-run dynamics 
Given the evidence for cointegration, we estimate an error-correction model where the cointegrating 
relationship (the stationary residuals from the OLS estimates (d) in table 1 (a) and table 2) are imposed 
as the long-run error correction term and the short-run dynamics are freely estimated (Engel and 
Granger, 1987).  Column (a) and (c) in table 4 present the resulting error-correction models.  
The coefficient on the residuals is negative and significant, which suggests that there is indeed error 
correction in the data. Column (b) and (d) present the same models, but with the long-run coefficients 
estimated rather than imposed. The two approaches generate similar results. Fig. 5 presents the 
impulse response functions of the non-oil/gas deficit following permanent shocks in current and 
permanent oil and gas revenue/production, the transitory component of the dependency ratio and net 
assets (based on estimates (b) and (d) of table 4. 
 
The top-left panel shows a much bigger boost in the deficit from a change in the current compared to 
the permanent oil and gas revenue.  The top-right panel indicates that this also holds for shocks to 
current and permanent production value. This illustrates the bird-in-hand flavor of the fiscal reaction 
to oil and gas revenue. However, the error bands show that the difference in the effect is just about 
statistically significant.  
 
The lower-left panel of fig. 5 gives the responses to a shock in the transitory component of the 
dependency ratio, the lower-right panel to a shock in net assets. The short run responses are very 
similar in the two models for both these variables. There is a strong contractionary short-run effect of a 
shock to net government assets.   
 
                                                     
13 Of course, as is usual in most of economics, we also abstract from time variations in preferences over intertemporal 
distribution, macroeconomic stabilization, environmental priorities, etc.  
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Figure 5: Impulse responses non-oil/gas primary deficit (percent of GDP)  
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Note: Responses of b to a 1%-point permanent shift in the listed right-hand side variable. Based on estimates (b) 
and (d) in table 4. 95%-error-bands are based on non-parametric bootstrapping (1000 replications). 
6. Is the fiscal stance sustainable? 
A fiscal regime is sustainable if the net debt grows at a pace not higher than the real growth-corrected 
interest rate (e.g., Hamilton and Flavin, 1986; Bohn 2007). Despite the strong current net asset 
position of Norway, insolvency might be an issue for Norway.14 Furthermore, fig. 6 indicates that lack 
of fiscal reforms implies that the estimated fiscal policy rules, (d) in table 1 and (a) in table 2, leads to 
a substantial running down of the currently strong net asset position over the next fifty years. Fig. 6 
also compares the estimated policy rules with the paths resulting from the prescriptions of the BIH and 
PIH rules (see appendix). Fig. 6 also gives the HC-PIH rule, which is defined as the PIH rule which 
ignores future public spending obligations arising from the expected increase in the dependency ratio 
and only takes account of future oil and gas revenue.  
 
                                                     
14 Estimating ,t t t tb n dη ε− = − +  η > r implies stable and 0 < η < r explosive (but not violating the no-Ponzi-games 
condition) paths for net government liabilities where r is the real growth-corrected interest rate. Our OLS estimate of η is -
0.086 with standard error 0.026, hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis that η < 0 at the 5% significance level and thus 
cannot reject insolvency of the public finances. However, this is a weak test. 
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The HC-PIH rule leads to a modest increase in sovereign wealth resulting from running a primary non-
oil/gas deficit of 5-7% of GDP. If one does take account of the rising burden of a graying population, 
the PIH rule is relevant and the government should run a much tighter fiscal stance. It then starts out 
with a primary non-oil/gas deficit which is about 5%-points of GDP less than under the HC-PIH rule. 
The tighter fiscal stance during the first two decades under the PIH rule leads to a much bigger 
accumulation of sovereign net wealth (negative net debt), 298 percent of GDP compared to 192 
percent of GDP under the HC-PIH rule in 2060, so that its return can pay for future pension 
obligations without having to cut public spending or raise taxes in the future. 
 
For comparison, the prediction of the Ministry of Finance (in January 2009) for the Fund in 2060 is 
176% of GDP, which is based on a large and detailed CGE-model and uses much more information 
than we can. This prediction also incorporates knowledge about the most recent official fiscal stance 
which our estimated fiscal stance cannot do as it is estimated from historical data. It happens to 
generate a Fund of about the same size as the HC-PIH rule which does not take account of the future 
rise in the burden of a graying population.  
 
Figure 6: Primary non-oil/gas deficit and net debt under estimated fiscal stance, HC-PIH & PIH 
(a) Non-oil/gas primary deficit   (b) Net government liabilities  
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Note: Based on forecasts of Ministry of Finance January-May 2009 (Perspektivmeldingen and 
Revised National Budget). “Estimated fiscal stance” refers to (d) in table 1 and “Estimated Fiscal 
stance (v and vp)” to (a) in table 2. The Fund was about 90% of GDP in 2007 and 2008. Other assets 
were 25% of GDP in 2007. For simplicity, we set other assets to zero in the simulations. 
 
The non-oil/gas primary budget deficit under the BIH rule equals 4% of the Fund. The size of the non-
oil/gas primary deficit under this rule grows from about 5% of GDP to almost 9% in the 2030s, and 
then declines to 7% of GDP in 2060. The two estimates of Norway’s historical fiscal stance ( (d) in 
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table 1 and (a) in table 2) imply higher non-oil/gas primary deficits in the first decades compared to 
the other more prudent scenarios. They shrink towards 2060, but lie above the deficits suggested by 
the PIH or BIH rules for more than three decades and induce accumulation of less net assets, reaching 
62% and 25% of GDP in 2060, respectively. The estimated scenarios and the BIH scenario all 
generate the inverted U-shape of the non-oil/gas primary deficit with relatively steep declines from 
around 2040. They thus imply less smoothing and more prudence towards the end of the period 
compared with the PIH-HC and PIH rules. Although sustainability may not be threatened over the next 
50 years, there will be a deterioration of the currently admirable sovereign wealth position.  
 
The projections presented in fig. 6 are uncertain. First, the fiscal reaction functions are uncertain due 
to the uncertainty of the estimated coefficients. The graphs of the impulse response functions 
presented in section 5 give a sense of the magnitude of that uncertainty. Second, the projections for the 
exogenous variables, especially that of the future oil price, are uncertain. To demonstrate the potential 
magnitude of this source of uncertainty, the solid lines in fig. 7 present the projected net government 
debt and deficit from our estimated fiscal stance (i.e., the “fiscal stance” projections in fig. 6) and the 
dashed lines the confidence bands corresponding to the approximate 2.5 percentile value of n and np 
and the 97.5 percentile value of n and np.15 The confidence bands represent lower and upper bounds as 
suggested by the historical volatility of government oil and gas revenue as share of GDP due to 
fluctuations in oil prices, oil production, government take and GDP (abstracting from parameter 
uncertainty. As before, the primary non-oil/gas deficit first rises whilst the oil boom still lasts and then 
falls rapidly during the following decades in order to provide for the future costs of a graying 
population. The simulations suggest that the lower band of the deficit varies between -6% and 2% of 
GDP; the upper band varies between 10% and 19% of GDP. The government’s net debt position is in 
2060 between -55% and 5% of GDP and has an expected value of 25% of GDP. The uncertainty is 
thus considerable. The high uncertainty of oil revenues underlines the need for fiscal reforms. Note 
that volatile valuation of the assets in the sovereign wealth fund adds to the uncertainty.  
 
Summing up, our estimates of the historical fiscal stance suggest that the solvability of Norway’s 
government finances is not in danger but declining oil and gas revenue and the rising gray burden 
necessitate a gradual tightening of the non-oil/gas primary deficit and a substantial worsening of the 
net government asset position. Taking account of uncertainty about future oil and gas revenue changes 
                                                     
15 The approximate 2.5 (97.5) percentile was calculated from subtracting (adding) 2 x the variable’s standard deviation of n 
and np over the period 1980-2007.    
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the quantitative but not the qualitative conclusions. In contrast, official projections incorporate the 
most recent fiscal reforms and suggest that the net government asset position remains strong.  
 
Figure 7: Uncertainty due to oil and gas revenue projections 
(a) Non-oil/gas primary deficit   (b) Net government liabilities  
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7. Concluding remarks 
Our estimates of forward-looking fiscal policy rules for an oil-rich developed economy were inspired 
by the PIH. To the best of our knowledge, we tested for the first time not only the effect of current oil 
revenues on the fiscal stance but also that of the present value of future oil and gas revenue. For this 
purpose, we calculated the permanent value of oil and gas revenues based on official forecasts of 
reserves and oil prices. Furthermore, we corrected for the potential endogeneity of oil and gas 
government revenue. We also used official projections of the dependency ratio to proxy future 
spending obligations and estimated a plausible effect of the transitory component of the permanent 
dependency ratio on the fiscal stance. Our estimates suggest that the fiscal stance does not fully react 
to oil and gas wealth under the ground, so the estimated fiscal stance has more elements of the bird-in-
hand approach than of the PIH. Available government solvency tests indicate that the fiscal stance 
may not be prudent enough in light of the already declining oil windfall and the looming rise in the 
pension burden inducing a running down of assets. Official projections have also indicated for some 
time that the combination of a rising demographic dependency ratio and falling oil and gas revenues 
and thereby declining inflows into the Sovereign Wealth Fund makes the fiscal future much more 
problematic than the present fiscal stance may lead politicians and the public to believe. 
The analytical and policy implications of the permanent income rule were well understood in the 
Norwegian policy debate. For example, the 1983 Tempo Committee recommended to convert assets 
under the ground into a Fund and to decouple oil and gas income from spending and the 1988 Steigum 
Committee advised that public income should depend on the permanent income of total oil and gas 
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wealth consisting of the value of in-situ oil and gas plus the Fund and also discussed important 
financial aspects of managing a portfolio consisting of financial assets as well as oil and gas wealth 
(see appendix 2). Norway wanted a pragmatic, operational and easy-to-understand policy rule, which 
requires credible, robust estimates of future, unproduced oil and gas revenues and the need to avoid 
political manipulation of say forecasts of future oil prices. Since smoothing of consumption, public 
spending and taxes ex ante may require large variations in the net liabilities or asset position in 
response to changes in the relevant present values, actual policy was more driven by bird-in-hand than 
permanent-income considerations. It is also important to realize that Norwegian policy might have 
relied on a different model than the simple one we put forward. In particular, we realize that the 
strength of Norwegian policy making is that it has learned and adjusted its policy rule over time. This 
is not captured by our time-invariant estimates of fiscal reaction functions, but our analysis does point 
to the dangers for solvency of public finances if reforms are not undertaken. 
 
In future work we want to explore the following avenues. First, it is interesting to compare the 
experience of Norway with other oil- and gas-rich economies. The Netherlands, for example, first 
squandered their gas revenue and from 1994 onward put it into an economic infrastructure fund and 
debt reduction while Norway put its oil revenues in a sovereign wealth fund. Second, the estimated 
fiscal rules can be road-tested with a real DSGE model as has been done for Mexico and Norway 
(Pieschacon, 2008) or an official full-scale CGE model (e.g., Heide, et al., 2006). Third, the interaction 
with monetary policy and the issue of the proper division of tasks between the central bank and fiscal 
authorities of oil-rich economies needs further study. Finally, the portfolio decisions between assets in 
the ground and assets in the fund need to be analyzed from the finance point of view (Chhaochharia 
and Laeven, 2008). So far, the evidence suggests that oil-rich countries do diversify their portfolio but 
hardly hedge against commodity price risks (Avendano, 2011). 
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Appendix 1: official forecasts, permanent values and description 
of other data  
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An alternative is to suppose that oil revenue stays constant from t+3, which yields: 
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e
t TX + is the Ministry of Finance’s forecast of t TX + at time t. tX equals oil income, oil price, oil 
production, dependency ratio or GDP.  T is the year farthest into the future for which a forecast was 
given. We base our estimates on the first approach, because this seems to be most realistic. The 
qualitative nature of our estimates does not vary much if either of the two alternatives is used. 
 
Variables measuring permanent values: Permanent values are calculated by the information approach, 
i.e., we use only published expectations from the authorities and a 2% discount rate. Projections of oil 
production and reserves are comparable over time, since they are given in volumes and we convert all 
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to standard cubic meters oil equivalents (Sm3 oil equivalents). Oil and gas production value is oil and 
gas production in oil equivalents multiplied with the oil price. Oil price and production value 
projections are recalculated to 2007-NOK for consistent comparison over time, and measured as 
shares of GDP in 2007-NOK. The dependency ratio of interest to the Ministry of Finance has changed 
over time. The lower age of the labor force has increased over time, while the pension age has varied 
between 65 and 70. We calculate the growth rate of the predicted dependency ratio at the time and 
apply this growth rate to the current dependency ratio convention of population aged 67 or more 
relative to population aged 20-66. We use the actual 67+/20-66 ratio for the year the projection was 
published as the start of each projection. For GDP, the Ministry’s projections focus on growth in real 
GDP and we apply its projected growth rates to a starting point set by GDP in 2007 prices.  
 
Current oil and gas revenue received by the state is as reported by the Ministry of Oil and Energy, and 
measured as described above. The current dependency ratio is the population aged 67 and higher 
divided by the population aged 20-66. Debt (i.e., net debt excluding the petroleum fund, denoted dg) 
and the Fund (the state’s pension fund abroad – previously called the petroleum fund, denoted f) are 
measured in current NOK as shares of GDP. The output gap is the logarithmic deviation from GDP 
trend, which is calculated from the Hodrik-Prescott filter of GDP in 2000 NOK with the smoothing 
parameter set to 1600 (the standard choice of the Norwegian Ministry of Finance for annual data). The 
Norwegian CPI serves as deflator to measure variables in 2007-NOK.  
 
Up to 2005 we use long-term budgets (Langtidsprogram) as our source for the Ministry’s expectations. 
The first long-term budget was published in 1953 with budgeting for the succeeding four years (1954-
57). The practice of a new long term budget every fourth year was maintained up to 2001, covering 
2002-05. Since then long-term budgeting has been replaced by long-run perspectives 
(Perspektivmelding 2004 and 2009). We have supplemented the long-term budgets and perspectives 
with detailed information from three parliamentary documents that explicitly address oil and gas 
issues (Stortingsmelding 25 1973-74, Stortingsmeldig 30 1973-74 and Tempomeldingen NOU 
1988:27). The budget documents up to 1998-2001 were from the Library of Statistics Norway. We 
focus on the fiscal reaction functions for the central government, which is the receiver of public oil 
rents.  
 
33 
The table below shows data definitions and sources.  
 
Variable definitions and data sources  
Variables Years Definition Table  Publication Inst. www 
Government revenue  
(including net capital income) 
1954-1975 Total revenue -interest payments - 
transfers from abroad 
Table 243 Historical statistics 1978 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/histstat/hs197
8/hs1978.pdf 
 1976-1977 Total revenue -interest payments Table 23-11 Historical statistics 1994 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/historis
k_statistikk/tabeller/23-23-11.txt 
 1978-2007 Total revenue -interest payments Statbank National accounts, Institutional 
sector accounts 
Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjec
ts/09/01/ 
n = Oil and gas revenue current 1954-1970 Set to zero as no production      
 1971-2007 Ordinary tax 
+ Special tax 
+ Production fee 
+ Area fee 
+ Environmental taxes 
+ Net cash flow SDFI 
+ Dividend StatoilHydro 
Table 1.1 Facts, The Norwegian 
Petroleum Sector 2008 
Ministry 
of 
Petroleum 
and 
Energy 
http://www.npd.no/en/Publicatio
ns/Facts/Facts-2008/ 
np = Oil and gas revenue 
 permanent 
 Calculated based on projections by 
Ministry of Finance and 
"information" approach 
Calculated    
Government expenditures  
(excluding capital expenses) 
1954-1975 Total expenditure - Increase in net 
claims - interest payments 
Table 243 Historical statistics 1978 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/histstat/hs197
8/hs1978.pdf 
 1976-1977 Total expenditure - interest 
payments 
Table 23-11 Historical statistics 1994 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/historis
k_statistikk/tabeller/23-23-11.txt 
 1978-2007 Transfers + Government 
consumption 
Statbank National accounts, Institutional 
sector accounts 
Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjec
ts/09/01/ 
Capital income  1954-1969 Capital income  Table 243 Historical statistics 1978 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/histstat/hs197
8/hs1978.pdf 
 1970-2007 Capital income   Database of the 
macroeconomic model Modag 
Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/09/90/s
os108/sos108.pdf 
Capital expenses 1954-1969 Capital expenses Table 243 Historical statistics 1978 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/histstat/hs197
8/hs1978.pdf 
 1970-2007 Capital expenses  Database of the 
macroeconomic model Modag 
Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/09/90/s
os108/sos108.pdf 
Gross assets 1954-1969  Table 244 Historical statistics 1978 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/histstat/hs197
8/hs1978.pdf 
 1970-2007   Database of the 
macroeconomic model Modag 
Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/09/90/s
os108/sos108.pdf 
Gross debt 1954-1969 Growth rate applied to calculate 
backwards from level in 1970 
Table 242 Historical statistics 1978 Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/histstat/hs197
8/hs1978.pdf 
 1970-2007   Database of the 
macroeconomic model Modag 
Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/emner/09/90/s
os108/sos108.pdf 
Gross Domestic Product  
in current NOK 
1954-2007   Historical accounts Central 
bank of 
Norway 
http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____42
332.aspx 
GDP deflator (expenditure side) 1954-2007 Index equal to 100 in 2000,  
but rescaled to 1 in 2007 so all  
fixed prices measured in 2007 NOK 
Historical accounts Central 
bank of 
Norway 
http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____42
332.aspx 
Non-oil/gas government revenue  Total government revenue – oil 
and gas revenue 
Calculated    
Net Capital income  Capital income - Capital expenses Calculated    
τ = Non-oil/gas primary  
government revenue 
 Non-oil/gas government revenue - 
(Net capital income -  Net cash 
flow SDFI - Dividend 
StatoilHydro) 
Calculated    
g = Government expenditures  Government expenditures Calculated    
b = Non-oil/gas primary  
government deficit 
 Non-oil/gas primary government 
revenue - Government 
expenditures 
Calculated    
p = Dependency ratio 
 current 
1954-2007 Population aged 67 and higher 
divided by population aged 20-66  
Calculated Population Statistics Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjec
ts/02/befolkning_en/ 
pp  = Dependency ratio  
permanent 
 Calculated based on projections by 
Ministry of Finance and 
"information" approach 
Calculated    
dg = debt   Gross debt - (Gross assets - Fund) 
 
National accounts, Institutional 
sector accounts 
Statistics 
Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/english/subjec
ts/09/01/ 
f = Fund 1954-1995 Set to zero     
 1996-2007 Fund value in current NOK by December 31st Central bank of Norway   
y = output gap 1954-2007 Gross Domestic Product in 2000 NOK, log of 
Gross Domestic Product as deviation from HP-
trend with smoothing parameter set to 1600. HP-
filtering was done by the authors 
Historical accounts Central 
bank of 
Norway 
http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____42
332.aspx 
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Background data and calculations for fig. 6 
The PIH simulations use forecasts of total transfers and suppose that the other components of 
government spending are a constant share of GDP. In our regressions, we use the dependency ratio. 
Our estimated coefficient includes in effect a “price”, which links the dependency ratio to government 
expenses, in addition to the behavioural effect of government spending on the fiscal stance. Given the 
predictions of transfers and the dependency ratio (Perspektivmeldingen 2009) and our calculations of 
their permanent values, we estimate 0.069 0.488t tg p= + and 0.080 0.458pt ptg p= + . Our estimates of the 
effect of the current and permanent dependency ratio on the non-oil/gas primary deficit suggest a 
coefficient of about 1 for the current dependency ratio and a coefficient of about −0.9 for the 
permanent dependency ratio (Harding and van der Ploeg, 2009). Translated into government transfers, 
our estimates imply that a 1%-point increase in current government transfers increases the non-oil/gas 
primary deficit with about 2%-points. A 1%-point increase in permanent government transfers 
decreases the non-oil/gas primary deficit with about 2%-points. To get values for the predicted value 
of current and predicted oil production as share of GDP (predicted n and np), we use the series for the 
predicted current government oil revenue as share of GDP (predicted n) and the coefficients as 
estimated in the first stage; column (a) upper panel of table 2 (i.e., in the simulations we set v=n/0.456 
and vp=np/0.456). We assume that government spending g equals total transfers, the discount factor is 
2%, the return on the fund is 4%, and that total transfers and oil and gas revenue to the state follow the 
paths presented by Ministry of Finance in January 2009 (Perspektivmeldingen 2009). The estimates 
are based on percentages of GDP, whereas the projections of Ministry of Finance on mainland GDP. 
The oil price used in the projections is about 65 USD per barrel. The projected size of the Fund is 
based on the series for the Fund-to-Mainland GDP and Mainland GDP-to-GDP presented by the 
Ministry of Finance in Perspektivmeldingen (2009). 
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Appendix 2: Emergence of the oil and gas windfall in Norway 
The history of Norway as a oil and gas nation started in 1969. Ten years after the Netherlands found 
gas in Slochteren, the first oil field within the territory of Norway – Ekofisk – was discovered. This 
was one of the world’s largest offshore oil basins and started production in the summer of 1971. Today 
there are 57 oil and gas fields in production and Norway is ranked as the fifth largest exporter and the 
11th largest producer of oil in the world. Norway was in 2006 the third largest exporter and sixth 
largest producer of gas. In 2007 the oil- and gas industry constituted 24 and 48 percent of GDP and 
exports, respectively.16 The Ministry of Oil and Energy (OED 2008) suggests that about 36 percent of 
expected total production is currently produced. The peak of oil production was probably passed 
around the turn of the millennium and the composition of production is tilting away from oil and other 
liquids towards gas. In 2007 gas contributed 40 percent of production. 
 
Both the time path of oil prices and that of oil and gas production and government revenue have a 
positive trend over the past four decades. Part of volatility of government income is caused by oil price 
fluctuations, but the tax regime and government’s direct engagements have also contributed 
substantially to volatility. The implicit tax rate on oil and gas revenues also has an upward trend.   
 
From the late 1970s to mid 1980s, effective ordinary and special tax rates on value added saw a 
volatile but gradual rise followed by a sharp fall in the late eighties and much lower rates during the 
1990s. Recent years have seen a sharp rise in these tax rates. Special taxes on oil and gas have since 
the early 1990s taken over from ordinary taxes in importance. Together they constitute almost 35 
percent of value added. The other big chunk of government revenue is net cash flow from the State’s 
Direct Financial Interest in the gas/oil industry (SDFI). After initial investment outlays of up to 20 
percent of value added in the mid 1980s, net return on state holdings is now more than one fifth of 
value added. Production fees used to be an important source of public revenue, but nowadays are 
almost gone. Dividends from Statoil have recently tracked (with a short lag) the development of oil 
prices and have now reached about 3 percent of value added. Environmental taxes rose from zero in 
1990 to 2.5 percent in 2000 but are a bit over half percent of value added. Area fees contribute even 
less to government revenue. Total public income from oil and gas revenues is now about 60 percent of 
value added, most of it being special and ordinary takes and returns from stake holdings. 
 
Government expectations of future oil and gas revenue have followed current revenue closely. 
Current values are lower than permanent values in the beginning of the hydrocarbon area, which is 
consistent with increasing production soon after oil and gas was discovered. The time path of current 
oil and gas revenues now lies above the permanent path as oil and gas revenues are expected to fall in 
the future. This should signal a shift from borrowing to saving oil and gas revenues; something the 
Norwegian government has started doing for some time. 
 
The 1960s and 1970s saw a gradual rise in both primary spending and non-oil/gas taxes. After the 
onset of oil and gas revenue in the early 1980s, taxes and spending first fell and then increased 
relentlessly, roughly in line with each other. The non-oil/gas primary deficit (b) has fluctuated around 
two plateaus, with the level shifting in the late 1970s. In the post war, pre-hydrocarbon period the 
government ran a surplus of about 3 percent of GDP. In the later period the average deficit has been 
around 4 percent of GDP. Oil revenue has allowed for running a higher non-oil/gas primary deficit. 
                                                     
16 For the history of oil and gas as well as the institutional background, we draw on OED (2008, Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy/Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, www.npd.no/NR/rdonlyres/24468CE3-30DC-497F-9E43-
501FBC48A131/17867/Facts_2008.pdf ) 
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The key question is whether the higher non-hydrocarbon primary deficits in the hydrocarbon era are 
sustainable in view of the long-term budgetary commitments of the Norwegian government. 
The fiscal rule backed by the Norwegian parliament in Spring 2001 states that the government on 
average should keep the structurally adjusted, non-oil/gas deficit in year t to 4 percent of the Fund at 
the end of the previous year. The deficit relative to the fund was close to 4 percent in 2001, so that the 
rule may be seen as a formalization of going policy at the time.  There has been a gradual increase in 
net government assets excluding the Fund (negative d) and a switch from a small surplus to a 
somewhat larger deficit for the non-oil/gas primary budget deficit. The two episodes in the 1980s and 
1990s with negative output gaps (high unemployment) are associated with large increases in the non-
oil/gas primary budget deficit. The Norwegian Fund started in 1990 and has since then rapidly 
increased to about 90 percent of GDP. The global financial crisis wiped out a big chunk of the Fund. 
 
We focus on the primary non-oil/gas deficit, cleaned for both net capital income and oil revenue and 
take all lending and borrowing and their associated revenues and costs should be taken into account. In 
contrast, the non-oil/gas budget deficit used by the Ministry of Finance includes net capital income 
(excluding those from hydrocarbon-related assets). The structural deficit used by the Ministry of 
Finance corrects the deficit for business cycle adjustments.17 The biggest deviation in our definition of 
the deficit and that of the Ministry of Finance occurs in 2000, which is most likely due to different 
treatment of the state’s direct oil engagement (SDFI).18     
 
The gradual rise in the 67+ dependency ratio in Norway has led to a gradual rise in the need for 
funding public pension obligations. In the far future, graying of the economy will increase spending 
needs even further, so that it is sensible to provide for these future needs by having a smaller budget 
deficit or a surplus. Given the relatively small size of Norway, its sovereign wealth fund is very large. 
 
In response to the oil and gas windfall, the Norwegian government has produced various policy 
documents and initiatives. In chronological order, they can be summarized as follows. 
1973-75: Analytical work by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Industry led to three 
important documents covering Dutch disease issues, size of reserves, likely lifecycles of fields and 
environmental concerns. There was not much discussion of long-run spending needs.  
 
1983: The Tempo Committee headed by Hermod Skånland, Central Bank Governor 1985-94, 
produced its report on “The Future of the Petroleum Activity” (NOU 1983: 27). It recommended the 
bird-in-hand approach, which says that the government should put its oil and gas revenues in a fund 
and spend only the real return on the assets accumulated in this fund.19 The Tempo Committee also 
discussed in detail how such a petroleum fund and spending rule should work in practise. It pointed 
out the importance of converting oil and gas assets in the ground into financial assets in a fund and of 
decoupling oil and gas income from spending. Due to political pressures to spend, the Tempo 
Committee discounted the likelihood of such a Stabilization Fund being implemented and therefore 
recommended slow extraction of oil and gas as a way to distribute oil and gas wealth to future 
generations. 
                                                     
17 It corresponds on average to 97% of the value difference since 1985. A regression explaining the difference with the 
business cycle adjustment gives R-squared of 0.87. The structural deficit is net of oil and gas revenue and should over time 
equal 4% of the fund measured at the end of the previous year. The Ministry also corrects for the business cycle, cyclical 
variations in transfers from the Central Bank and capital income, and special accounting circumstances (see Revised National 
Budget for 2004, p. 29).       
18 From 1999 to 2000 the cash flow from this engagement went from 25 billion NOK to 98 billion NOK. We assume that 
income from SDFI is counted as capital income and exclude it from our definition of the deficit.  
19 See speech (in Norwegian) of research director Ådne Cappelen, Statistics Norway, 2000, for discussion of spending of oil 
money (www.ssb.no/forskning/foredrag/arkiv/art-2000-10-06-01.html). 
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1988: The policy Committee headed by Professor Erling Steigum, then NHH Bergen and now at BI 
Oslo, presented its report “The Norwegian Economy in Change - Prospects for National Wealth and 
Economic Policy in the 1990s” (NOU 1988: 21). This report suggested that government spending 
should depend on the permanent income of total oil and gas wealth consisting of the financial fund 
plus the value of oil and gas reserves in the ground. The calculation of total oil and gas wealth requires 
the prediction of an optimal depletion path given expected oil/gas prices, technology and interest rates. 
In contrast to the Tempo Committee, the Steigum Committee did argue for the establishment of a 
financial hydrocarbon fund. It stressed the importance of regarding such a fund and the value of oil 
and gas reserves in the ground as part of the same portfolio. It also offered arguments for selling oil 
before extracting the oil as well as for going short in oil stocks.  
 
2001: The Norwegian government implemented its 4% BIH rule, which allows for a business-cycle 
corrected deficit equal to 4 percent of the value of the Fund measured in Norwegian kroner at the end 
of year t−1. Hence, 4 percent of the value of the Fund at the end of the previous year is allowed to be 
extracted from the Fund and to be used to fund the general government deficit. The Fiscal Policy 
Guideline (Handlingsregelen) interpreted the 4% as the expected future real rate of return of the 
Government Pension Fund, so non-renewable petroleum wealth had to be invested abroad and 
transformed into financial wealth (5% of which in property). The basis sustainability rule was inspired 
by Hartwick (1977) and starts only the expected future rate on return could be used for domestic 
consumption purposes. 
 
2006: The Government Pension Fund of Norway comprises two separately managed funds. The main 
one is the Government Pension Fund Global renamed 1 January 2006 and part of the Norwegian 
Central Bank (formerly The Government Petroleum Fund established in 1990 and receiving money 
since 1996). It manages the surplus wealth produced by Norwegian petroleum income (taxes and 
licenses) and had a value of NOK 2.385 trillion in August 2009. This made it the largest pension fund 
in Europe and the second largest in the world. Its objective is to counter the decline of expected 
petroleum income and to smooth the disrupting effects of highly fluctuating oil prices. Since 1998, the 
fund was allowed to invest up to 40 percent of its assets in the international stock market, but this was 
increased to 60 percent in 2007. Much of the debate surrounding the fund is on how to contain the 
risks in investing in the international stock market, ensure ethically sound investments (away from 
arms and tobacco) and avoid inflation when its return is spent. The other fund is the Government 
Pension Fund Norway renamed 1 January 2006 (formerly The National Insurance Scheme Fund 
established in 1967) has value of NOK 106.9 billion at end of 2006. 
 
2006: The Norwegian government undertook reforms to trim pension rights. Pensions are no longer 
indexed to wage growth but indexed to the average of wage growth and inflation (typically, less). 
Furthermore, the lifetime value of the pension is a fixed amount calculated around age 60 and is based 
on expected average life expectancy for the cohort of 60-year olds. The focus is on keeping people in 
work longer and to retire later whilst allowing for some freedom of choice. The individual can decide 
whether to work long and enjoy a higher pension pay per retirement year or enjoy more retirement 
years with a lower pension. The average de facto retirement age (including early retirement and partly 
disabled) is currently (“pre-reform”) around 59 years, but is expected to rise a little. Compared with 
most OECD countries, Norway’s pension system is still very generous. 
